CLICK TO READ United States v. Allen Enoch, Docket # 17-2089

Defendant appealed his enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).  In this appeal, he argues that his prior Pennsylvania convictions for first-degree robbery should count as a single offense because they were committed on one occasion.  His prior convictions included five Pennsylvania first-degree robbery convictions under 18 Pa. C.S. § 3701 arising from his conduct on one day in 1998.  In the pre-sentence report, the probation officer deemed Enoch an armed career criminal because at least three of those robberies qualified as “violent felonies” under ACCA.  The District Court agreed, but instead granted a downward departure and sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment.  Six years later, he moved to correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 following the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which he argued held that his prior robbery convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies under ACCA.  Johnson invalidated as unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” of ACCA, which covered crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that “involve[d] conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  Enoch argued his robbery convictions only qualified under the residual clause, rendering his ACCA-enhanced sentence illegal.  The District Court rejected this argument and denied Enoch’s § 2255 motion.  Enoch then filed a motion for a Certificate of Appealability.

While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022), which reconciled the Circuits’ differing interpretations of ACCA’s “occasions” clause and held that a single occasion “may itself encompass multiple, temporally distinct activities.”  Wooden holds that employing a multi-factored inquiry when applying the “occasions” clause furthers what the Court has “always recognized as the ACCA’s purpose”—to address those offenders who have “repeatedly committed violent crimes.”  Because there is insufficient information in the record, the Third Circuit remanded for the District Court to make the initial decision as to whether Defendant’s convictions constitute a single, or multiple, episodes.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Christopher Montalvo-Flores, Docket # 22-1752

In November 2019, officers executed an arrest warrant for Montalvo-Flores related to a robbery investigation at a New Jersey hotel. During the arrest, they found car keys on him, and although Montalvo-Flores claimed ownership of the keys, the officers knew he didn’t have a valid driver’s license. They located the car in the hotel parking lot, registered to Enterprise Rental Car Company, and sought permission to search it. Officers informed Enterprise’s regional risk manager that Montalvo-Flores was involved in criminal activity while operating the vehicle. The manager, aware that the rental contract prohibited using the car for criminal purposes and that Montalvo-Flores wasn’t listed on the agreement, granted consent to search the car. In the trunk, officers discovered 304 grams of cocaine, and in the center console, they found $35. Montalvo-Flores faced charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Montalvo-Flores moved to suppress the cocaine and cash, arguing he had lawful possession and control of the vehicle with his girlfriend’s permission. The government acknowledged that Montalvo-Flores had his girlfriend’s consent to drive the car. Still, it asserted that the warrantless search was lawful because he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy due to his lack of a driver’s license and absence from the rental agreement, and they had obtained consent from Enterprise, the registered owner. The District Court held a suppression hearing where Detective Abdullah Holmes testified.

Holmes confirmed that Montalvo-Flores’ girlfriend had rented the car, and Montalvo-Flores had possession of the car keys. When officers took the keys from him, he claimed they were his “rent-a-car keys.” Officers observed Montalvo-Flores driving the vehicle after Pisciotta (his girlfriend) exchanged it with him. Holmes also mentioned that Montalvo-Flores had operated the vehicle. Furthermore, Holmes detailed how an Enterprise agent granted permission to search the car after he informed her of Montalvo-Flores’ arrest for outstanding warrants and his lack of a driver’s license. Following the agent’s authorization, officers discovered the cocaine and cash.

The District Court denied Montalvo-Flores’s motion to suppress, reasoning that he lacked standing due to his failure to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.

The Third Circuit reversed, finding that there is no question Defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the rental car. When officers took the keys from him, he exclaimed “those are my rent-a-car keys!” The officers needed the keys to open the locked vehicle parked outside his hotel. Thus, Montalvo-Flores no doubt believed he had privacy in the car and took steps to preserve his privacy.  The Third Circuit also held that the expectation of privacy was reasonable because he had the girlfriend’s keys with her permission.  The conviction was reversed and remanded for the District Court to consider whether the warrantless search of the car was reasonable.

There was a dissenting opinion.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Keith Gant, Docket # 21-3117

Defendant was convicted of firearms and drug charges and sentenced to 211 months.  The conviction was affirmed, but the sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing because the District Court improperly calculated Gant’s offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

First, the District Court erred by concluding that Gant’s base offense level was twenty-four pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(2). That provision applies when a defendant has two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Because Gant’s two prior convictions were not separated by an intervening arrest and the sentence for each conviction was imposed on the same day, they qualify as one conviction for Guidelines purposes. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) cmt. n.10  Second, the District Court plainly erred by applying the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). That enhancement applies when a defendant possesses a firearm during “another felony offense,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)—in Gant’s case, heroin trafficking. The enhancement, however, does not apply where the defendant is also subject to § 924(c)’s statutory mandatory minimum. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b). Because Gant was subject to § 924(c)’s mandatory minimum, the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was not applicable.  As a result, because these two errors could change Gant’s Guidelines range, they “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, [and] public reputation” of the proceedings, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Stamatios Kousisis, Docket # 19-3679 _ 19-3774

Defendant and his corporation were convicted of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, three counts of Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and False Statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but reversed the sentences based upon Loss Calculation.

The District Court determined the loss was the “ill-gotten profits.”  However, the work contracted for had been performed, and it was uncontested that the quality of the work was sufficient.  The Third Circuit held that the Loss Calculation in this case was the value of the contracts minus the value of performance on the contracts.  Because the Loss Calculation was significantly lower, the case was remanded for further fact-finding and recalculation of the appropriate Loss Amount and Sentencing Guidelines.