CLICK TO READ United States v. Daniel Wert, Docket # 22-11965

Defendant was convicted in 1997 of Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana and Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and was sentenced to life imprisonment.  In 2021 he filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  The District Court denied the motion primarily based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors “considered” by the sentencing judge without any further explanation.  The district court did not determine whether Mr. Wert had established an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release, and instead focused its analysis on the “[s]ection 3553 [f]actors and [d]anger to the [c]ommunity.”  The district court found Mr. Wert’s argument for a sentence reduction “unavailing.” It explained that “[t]he sealed Presentence Report filed on August 6, 1997, clearly indicates why the sentencing judge was so clear and unequivocal in stating that the Defendant shall remain in prison the rest of his life.” It further concluded that Mr. Wert’s “request falls well short of meeting any of the necessary criteria in the applicable § 3553(a) factors.”

The Eleventh Circuit held this was an abuse of discretion because its explanation and analysis are insufficient for meaningful appellate review.  First, the parties agree that the transcript of Mr. Wert’s sentencing in 1997 is unavailable.  Second, none of the sentencing materials—the PSR, the sentencing minutes, the statement of reasons, and the judgment demonstrate which § 3553(a) factors that were considered significant by the original sentencing judge or the findings made with respect to the § 3553(a) factors.  By relying on statements by the sentencing judge that are not a part of the record, it adequately failed to consider the applicable statutory factors.

Remanded for further consideration.

CLICK TO READ United States v. James Reginald Talley, Docket # 22-13921

In this appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that absconding from Supervised Release does not toll the period of Supervised Release and violations committed after the expiration of Supervised Release cannot form the basis of a revocation and imprisonment. The judgment revoking Supervised Release and imposing a term of imprisonment was reversed and remanded for resentencing.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Lewgene Meeks, Docket # 22-14145

In February 2022, the Tallahassee Police Department received a tip that Lewgene Meeks, a recently released ex-convict, was involved in drug dealing. They conducted surveillance on Meeks and suspected he had drugs in his car. Both plainclothes and uniformed officers started following Meeks with the intention of performing a traffic stop to search his vehicle.

The lead investigator instructed Officer Glenn Farmer to confirm whether Meeks was wearing his seatbelt. Farmer pulled up beside Meeks’ car and claimed to have seen that Meeks was not wearing a seatbelt. Based on this observation, the police pulled Meeks over and found a substantial amount of drugs in his possession, including powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and alpha-PVP (Molly).

Meeks sought to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, as he believed he had not violated any traffic laws, and Farmer’s claim was mistaken. However, the district court denied Meeks’ motion to suppress. Subsequently, Meeks pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute but retained the right to appeal the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress.

This case revolves around whether the initial traffic stop of Meeks was conducted with sufficient legal justification and whether the evidence obtained from the stop should be admissible in court.

While a police officer’s reasonable mistake of fact can provide the basis for a valid traffic stop, the mistake must be just that—reasonable. Members of the Tallahassee Police Department stopped Lewgene Meeks because an officer thought that he saw Meeks driving without a seatbelt. But the district court weighed the evidence and found that Meeks had been properly wearing his seatbelt before being stopped. Because the government offered no evidence that the officer’s mistaken conclusion was objectively reasonable, the district court’s denial of Meeks’ motion to suppress evidence of his drug crimes arising from the stop was erroneous.

Reversed, suppression granted.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Lisette Lopez, Docket # 21-12709

In this appeal, the Eleventh Circuit decided a question of first impression in this Circuit – how to apply the categorical approach to a conspiracy crime.  The United States sought to revoke Lisette Lopez’s naturalization on the ground that she committed a crime of moral turpitude within five years of applying for citizenship and willfully concealed or misrepresented during the application process the fact that she had committed a crime. The District Court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Government on the ground that Lopez had committed a crime of moral turpitude during the statutory period. Because the crime to which Lopez pleaded guilty – Conspiring to Launder Money – did not categorically involve moral turpitude, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Marty Eugene Days, Jr., Docket # 22-13305

Defendant appealed his 27-month sentence for possession of ammunition by a felon. The sentence was enhanced under Guideline § 2K2.1 based on his prior Florida conviction for Attempted Armed Robbery, which the District Court ruled was a Crime of Violence.  The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida Attempted Armed Robbery cannot satisfy the elements clause of a “Crime of Violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), nor is it an enumerated crime under the statute.  In light of the recent Supreme Court decision of United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), and the Eleventh Circuit decision in United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023), the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Peter Elijah Metzler, Docket # 22-13759

In this appeal, Defendant was convicted of Bank Robbery and sentenced to 120 months after he was designated a Career Offender under Guideline § 4B1.1.  The enhancement was based on his prior Florida conviction of Attempted Strong Arm Robbery.  The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida Attempted Strong Arm Robbery cannot satisfy the elements clause of a “Crime of Violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), nor is it an enumerated crime under the statute.