TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Andre Rashad Dillard, Docket # WR-94,879-01

Applicant was convicted of delivery of cocaine and sentenced to 180 days in the State Jail. Applicant, through habeas counsel, filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. Applicant contends that his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not know of the bad acts of the police officer who implicated him in this alleged offense. The State and the trial court agree that Applicant’s plea was involuntary.  Relief granted, conviction set aside.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Cedric Friel Woods, Docket # WR-94,858-01

 Applicant was convicted of delivery of cocaine and sentenced to one year in the State Jail.  Applicant, through habeas counsel, filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Applicant contends that his plea was involuntary because he did not know of the bad acts of the police officer who implicated him in this alleged offense. The State and the trial court agree that Applicant’s plea was involuntary. Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).  Habeas petition granted, conviction set aside and new trial ordered.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Jeffrey Don Davidson, Docket # WR-94,274-02

Applicant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and originally received deferred adjudication community supervision. He was later adjudicated guilty and sentenced to twenty-four months’ state jail imprisonment. He filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 11.07.  Applicant contends that he was denied his right to an appeal through no fault of his own.  Based on the record, the trial court has found that trial counsel indicated that Applicant intended to appeal after adjudication, and presented a written notice of appeal to the district clerk in open court. However, that notice of appeal was not filed, and Applicant’s appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The trial court concludes that Applicant was denied the right to appeal, not due to any ineffectiveness on the part of trial counsel, but rather due to a breakdown in the system.  Habeas relief granted, Applicant permitted to appeal

 CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Louis R. Clemons, Docket # WR-85,379-02

 Applicant was convicted of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to 99 years’ imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Clemons v. State, No. 01-16-00336-CR (Tex. App.–Houston[1st], Aug. 17, 2017).  His appellate attorney failed to notify him that his conviction was affirmed in a timely manner and that he had the right to petition the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review.  Relief was granted and Applicant was permitted to file an out-of-time petition for discretionary review.

 CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Mark Twain Simpson, Docket # WR-15,305-03

 Applicant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Simpson v. State, 05-14-00618-CR (Tex.App.—Dallas April 20, 2015)(not designated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court.  Applicant contends that counsel was ineffective and that he is being improperly denied street time credit on this sentence for time spent on appellate bond. If a person is on appellate bond, the mandate on his appeal issues, but he is not notified that his appeal is affirmed, and he does not violate his bond, then he may be entitled to time credit for the time he is erroneously allowed to be out of custody from the time the mandate issues until the time he is taken into custody to serve the sentence. Ex parte Thiles, 333 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The trial court found that Applicant was never informed that his conviction was affirmed on appeal and that he never violated his appellate bond. It therefore recommended that Applicant receive time credited on his sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and granted relief on the time credit issue only.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Shanta Renchie, Docket # WR-94,940-01

 Applicant pleaded guilty to of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced pursuant to Section 12.44(a) of the Texas Penal Code to ninety days’ imprisonment in county jail. Applicant filed this application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Applicant contends that she was denied due process and that her plea was involuntary because she did not know of the bad acts of the officer who implicated her in this alleged offense. The State and the trial court agree that the presumptively false evidence used to justify the arrest of Applicant was material, and that her plea was involuntary.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Thomas Anthony Gutierrez, Docket # WR-94,789-01 (Concurring)

In this concurring opinion granting Applicant postconviction habeas relief in the form of an out-of-time appeal, Judge Slaughter stressed the importance of counsel’s duty to file a timely notice of appeal when his client expresses a desire to appeal. This issue underlies far too many ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases before the Court of Criminal Appeals and is a troubling sign that many attorneys are either unaware of the proper procedures for filing a notice of appeal or are aware of such requirements but are failing to stay on top of their responsibilities to clients.

TEXAS FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ Tairon Jose Monjaras v. State of Texas, Docket # 01-19-00608-CR

 On DecEmber 12, 2018, Houston Police Department (HPD) Officer J. Sallee and his partner were patrolling a “high crime area” without their patrol car’s lights or siren activated. They entered the La Plaza apartment complex and noticed appellant, who appeared nervous and overly dressed for the weather. Appellant’s behavior caught their attention, but they did not suspect him of any crime.

Sallee made a U-turn to observe appellant’s actions and later approached him for a “consensual encounter.” During this interaction, Sallee did not suspect appellant of any wrongdoing and did not display his firearm. Appellant voluntarily engaged in conversation, provided his name, and agreed to be searched.

During the search, Sallee found bullets in appellant’s backpack, leading him to believe there might be a concealed firearm. A struggle ensued when Sallee attempted to search appellant further. Eventually, they subdued appellant and found a loaded .22 caliber revolver.

HPD Officer C. Starks corroborated Sallee’s account, emphasizing that the encounter was consensual, they did not display their firearms, and appellant was free to leave.

Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and moved to suppress.  The trial court admitted evidence body-worn camera footage, showing the encounter’s details. Appellant’s motion to suppress this evidence was denied.

The Court of Appeals held that the initial consensual encounter escalated into an investigative detention at the point when the police moved very close to Defendant and told him “manos, manos” while directing him to hold his hands out, and the other officer had their hands on Defendant’s back.  Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not believe they were free to leave.  The investigative detention was unsupported by reasonable suspicion.  Standing alone, neither the area’s high-crime reputation, appellant’s decision to look away and walk away as Officers Sallee and Starks passed him in their patrol car, nor appellant’s purported “nervousness” when the officers actually spoke to him, gives rise to reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant had engaged, or was about to engage, in criminal activity.  As a result the search of the backpack and recovery of physical evidence was a warrantless search that violated the Fourth Amendment.  Motion to suppress granted, Indictment dismissed.

 CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Quoc Huynh, Docket # 01-22-00645, 01-22-00646

This is an interlocutory appeal by the State, challenging the trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress a search warrant for blood evidence and testing results.  The Court of Appeals reversed and denied suppression. 

Appellee was charged by two informations with the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”), second offense and the misdemeanor offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon in a motor vehicle after he was observed speeding and pulled over.  Defendant exhibited signs of intoxication and refused to perform standard field sobriety tests and to provide a blood or breath sample.  A court issued a search warrant authorizing a blood draw, and Defendant moved to suppress.  In the motion, he challenged the assertions that he exhibited signs of intoxication and argued the officer’s body camera contradicted the police officer’s claims of his intoxicated appearance.  The trial court relied upon not only the affidavit in support of the search warrant application, but the officer’s testimony at a prior suppression hearing in the same case and granted the motion. 

The First Court of Appeals reversed, finding error in the trial court going beyond the four corners of the search warrant application in granting the motion to suppress.

TEXAS SECOND COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ Andell Brymonte Pittman v. The State of Texas, Docket # 04-21-00376-CR

Appeal of a conviction and sentence for Burglary of a Habitation with Intent to Commit assault.  The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the sentence and remanded because Pittman was sentenced via videoconference and did not affirmatively waive his right to be present.  This violated Article

42.03 § 1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which requires physical presence, or a waiver.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Juan Esteban Vazquez-Bautista, Docket # 04-22-00630-CR

Juan Esteban Vazquez-Bautista, a noncitizen, was arrested for trespassing on private property in Webb County as part of Operation Lone Star (OLS), directed by Texas Governor Greg Abbott to secure the border. Vazquez filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging selective prosecution based on gender discrimination in violation of his equal protection rights.

During his habeas corpus hearing, a State Trooper testified about Vazquez’s arrest, where he was detained and then released on bail. Claudia Molina from the Lubbock Private Defender’s Office explained the process of appointing counsel for individuals arrested under OLS, focusing on criminal trespass and smuggling cases. Notably, Molina stated that she had not seen any women prosecuted for misdemeanor trespass as part of OLS. She provided statistics showing that none of the misdemeanor trespass cases charged women in the OLS cases assigned to her office.

The trial court denied Vazquez’s request for relief, prompting his appeal. The appellate court referenced a previous case, Ex parte Aparicio, which addressed similar claims of gender discrimination in the prosecution of male defendants charged with misdemeanor trespass as part of OLS. In that case, the court found that the appellant had raised a valid issue and reversed, requiring the State to justify its gender discrimination.

In Vazquez’s case, the court determined that his claims were also valid and cognizable through a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. They concluded that Vazquez had established a prima facie case of gender discrimination in the State’s execution of OLS. As a result, they reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to require the State to respond to both federal and state selective-prosecution claims based on equal protection. The trial court was also instructed to make specific findings and conclusions regarding whether the State met its burden of proof to justify its treatment of Vazquez.

The Court of Criminal Appeals found merit in his claims of gender discrimination in the prosecution under Operation Lone Star, and reversed the trial court’s decision, sending the case back for further proceedings and justification by the State.

TEXAS FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Gus Mays, Jr., Docket # 05-22-01353-CR, 05-22-01354-CR, 05-22-01355-CR, 05-22-01356-CR

The State appeals from an order granting the Defendant’s motion for Chapter 64 DNA testing following his conviction for capital murder and sentence of life imprisonment.  Defendant was convicted in 1993 of murder, and in 2018 filed a motion for the appointment of counsel to to assist him in presenting his chapter 64 motion for post-conviction DNA testing, arguing that DNA exculpatory evidence existed, but did not specify what the evidence was.  The State responded that there were several items available for testing – fingernail clippings from the murder victims, spent casings and bullet fragments, and an envelope “said to contain apparent blood.”  The State argued against DNA testing, and the trial court orally granted an order for DNA testing, but did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law, despite the State’s request.  The Fifth Court of Appeals reversed, finding Mays did not meet his burden to show he would not have been convicted if DNA testing of the fingernail clippings had produced an exculpatory result.

TEXAS SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Mason LeBlanc, Docket # 07-22-00201-CR

On August 29, 2020, Officer David Clish responded to a one-vehicle rollover accident involving a Ford pickup truck driven by LeBlanc. LeBlanc was found trapped inside the cab and appeared intoxicated to an unidentified witness at the scene. Emergency personnel arrived, and after LeBlanc exited the truck, Clish administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test to check for signs of intoxication. During the test, LeBlanc sat down on the grass and then completed the test while seated.

Clish reported detecting six out of six clues on the HGN test, indicating possible intoxication. Corporal Brian Harshman, another officer at the scene, smelled alcohol on LeBlanc and observed slowed speech as LeBlanc stood up from sitting. Following field sobriety tests, Clish arrested LeBlanc for DWI.

LeBlanc filed a motion to suppress the HGN test results and the blood test results, arguing that there was no probable cause for his arrest based on the totality of the circumstances. The trial court granted LeBlanc’s motion to suppress, citing Clish’s lack of credibility in describing indicators of intoxication.

The State appealed, contending that the trial court erred in not considering the collective knowledge of both Clish and Harshman in assessing probable cause for the arrest.

The Seventh Court of Appeals agreed with the State, noting that the collective knowledge doctrine allows the cumulative information held by cooperating officers to be considered in assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Since Clish and Harshman were both responding to the same call, present at the scene, had some communication with LeBlanc, and participated in the arrest, their collective knowledge should have been considered in the probable cause analysis. The trial court’s refusal to consider Harshman’s observations as relevant constituted an error.

The Seventh Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for reconsideration of probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances and the collective knowledge of both officers.

There is a good dissenting opinion HERE: The State of Texas v. Mason LeBlanc, Docket # 07-22-00201-CR (Dissent)

TEXAS EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS NINTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Charles Joseph Meras, Docket # 10-18-00345-CR

The case revolves around a traffic stop of Meras in September 2017 based on a particular section of the Texas Traffic Code, section 545.060(a). At the time of the traffic stop, there was no clear interpretation of this section by the Court of Criminal Appeals or the local court. The crucial interpretation only came in November 2022, through the opinion in the Hardin case.

The court considers this situation as a reasonable mistake of law by the officer who pulled over Meras. In such cases, where an officer makes a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of traffic law, it can still provide a basis for reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop, as established in the Heien v. North Carolina case.

However, the key difference in this case from the Hardin case is that the State argued in the trial court that the officer’s mistake of law should be considered as a reason to deny Meras’s motion to suppress. Due to the State’s argument, the trial court’s decision to grant Meras’s motion to suppress is deemed an error.

As a result, the trial court’s order granting Meras’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is sent back to the trial court for further proceedings, considering the officer’s reasonable mistake of law in initiating the traffic stop.

TEXAS ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS THIRTEENT COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ Emekwanem Ibe Biosah v. The State of Texas, Docket # 14-20-00243-CR

Appellant Emekwanem Ibe Biosah pleaded guilty to fraudulent use of identifying information, five or more but less than ten items, a third degree felony, and was sentenced to two years’ confinement.  The State and appellant now agree that the evidence admitted in the punishment hearing shows he used fewer than five items, for which punishment should be assessed as a state jail felony.  The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Jasper Robin Chen, Docket # 14-19-00372-CR, 14-19-00373-CR

This appeal is decided upon remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, which remanded for the Court of Appeals to reconsider a facial challenge to Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7) the electronic harassment statute, in light of recent decisions from the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant was charged with harassing the complainant through e-mail and instant messages.  Defendant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus and motion to quash the information, arguing that the statute under which he was charged, Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7)  (the  “electronic-communications-harassment  statute”),  is facially  unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him under the First Amendment.  The trial court found the statute unconstitutional and granted the application, and the State appealed.  Initially, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals found the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, but then the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Ex parte Barton, 662 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) and Ex parte Sanders, 663 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022), and in both of those related cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that earlier versions of the electronic-harassment statute were not facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.  In light of its decisions in Barton and Sanders, the court of criminal appeals vacated the judgment in this case and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and reinstated the charges.