FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

No reversals reported.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ J.B. v. State of Florida, Docket # 4D19-2634

Juvenile delinquency adjudication for making a false report reversed, dismissed. 

J.B. was a student in an alternative school, and became verbally aggressive during an argument with a school security guard.  The juvenile then told the witness that he was going to shoot him and shoot up his house.  The security guard testified he was shocked but not scared because he was frequently threatened by students.  Several days later, the security guard reported the threat to school officials.  He also said J.B. apologized to him and never followed through on the threat.

Based on these facts, the Fifth DCA reversed.  The court found the threat was not a false report under Florida Statutes § 790.163(1).  Appellant was not trying to “make known to the proper authorities,” i.e., the school behavioral technician, that another person was going to “shoot you and shoot up your house.” Instead, Appellant was conveying a threat.  Thus, his actions did not constitute the crime of making a false report.

Reversed and dismissed.

CLICK TO READ State of Florida v. Jorge Torres, Docket # 4D20-225

State appeal of an order granting a defense motion in limine to exclude screenshots of text messages received by a sexual assault victim based on a lack of proper authentication.  Order reversed, evidence ruled admissible.

Defendant was charged with sexual molestation of his minor cousin when she was about 12 years old.  When she was 15, she began receiving text messages from Defendant that was sexual in nature through the messaging application Kik.  She took screenshots of the messages for reporting the abuse when she was older.

The victim acknowledged that the sender’s profile picture did not show the Defendant, but testified she could tell that the Defendant was the sender because of the messages’ content. The sender identified himself by using a screen name that was a nickname the Defendant’s family members used for him. Significantly, the text messages referenced information known only to the victim and the Defendant.

At a hearing on the motion to exclude, the State told the court that Kik was operated by a Canadian company that would not comply with a subpoena from the United States, which was why the original documents did not exist.  The Defendant argued that the text messages contained insufficient evidence connecting the text messages to the Defendant, specifically pointing to the absence of a phone number or identifying name information in the messages. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion in limine and excluded the evidence of the messages primarily based on the State’s failure to establish authentication.

The State appealed, and the Fifth DCA reversed, holding that the messages were sufficiently authenticated and should not have been excluded by the trial court.

Testimony that a person received a text or e-mail from another is not sufficient, by itself, to authenticate the identity of the sender.  However, other factors can circumstantially authenticate such messages.  Even when messages are not obtained directly from the sender’s phone, electronic communications, like other traditional communications, may be authenticated by appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics taken in conjunction with the circumstances.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

 CLICK TO READ State of Florida v. Christopher C. Finley, Docket # 5D19-2586

State’s appeal of an order granting post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  Order reversed in part, but affirmed in part.  New trial ordered on one ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Ground upon which the Fifth DCA affirmed was the failure to investigate and call an alibi witness

Read the order HERE:

Christopher C. Finley – Order Granting Motion for PostConviction Relief 8-21-2019

CLICK TO READ Cameron Trey Rogers v. State of Florida, Docket # 5D19-1792

Appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss under the Stand Your Ground Law, order reversed.

Defendant and his girlfriend were involved in a physical altercation with the complainant.  At the Stand Your Ground Hearing, witnesses testified that the complainant was the aggressor, grabbing the girlfriend by the arm from behind as she was walking with Defendant.  The Defendant testified that he told the complainant to release her, and when he let go, he tried to punch Defendant several times.  Defendant responded by punching the complainant in the eye once.  The trial court held that the defense failed to establish a prima facie case of self defense.

The Fifth DCA reversed.  The court held that the testimony at the hearing established that the complainant was the first party to use force, and that the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of self defense.  Once that occurred, the State was obligated to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Defendant did not act in self-defense.

Case remanded for further determination.

CLICK TO READ Victor Williams v. State of Florida, Docket # 5D20-229

 Defendant was convicted of having unlawful sexual activity with a minor, and sentenced to prison and probation.  The probation order included a special condition prohibiting Williams from having contact with a child under the age of eighteen.  Williams challenged the imposition of this condition in a motion to correct sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). In his motion, Williams argued that this condition of probation was overbroad. The trial court denied the motion.

The Fifth DCA reversed because the condition was overly broad because it subjects offenders to possible punishment for innocent or inadvertent conduct.  On remand, the trial court should modify this condition of probation to prohibit only intentional contact with minors without court approval.