FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

No reversals reported.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ Scott Levine v. State of Florida, Docket # 4D20-118

Appeals conviction and sentence for indirect criminal contempt. Attorney failed to perform much of any discovery or follow orders of the court. Blamed this on depression and medical conditions.

Court issued an order to show cause. The order to show cause directed Levine “to show cause why he should not be held in and punished for indirect criminal contempt of Court, pursuant to rule 3.840, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, for knowingly and intentionally failing to comply with the orders of this Court.” The order recites the titles of the four court orders Levine was accused of violating without setting forth any “essential facts” constituting the contempt.

Because the order to show cause did not state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged, and did not otherwise attach or incorporate anything to provide notice of such facts, reverse without prejudice to initiate new indirect criminal contempt proceedings or to impose some other sanction short of criminal contempt.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ Herbert Leon Manago Jr., v. State of Florida, Docket # 5D20-632

Appeals resentencing of juvenile life without the possibility of parole sentence for a 2004 first-degree murder. Argues that the court should have resentenced him pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2014), as he requested and that the court erred by sentencing him pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)1. Appellant was charged with two co-defendants for first-degree felony murder in connection with a carjacking. Jury verdict did not specify whether he was the shooter or under a principal theory.

He sought to be resentenced pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., which provides that a juvenile convicted of a capital felony, “who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim,” may be sentenced to prison for life or a term of years equivalent to life, but would be entitled to a review of his sentence under section 921.1402(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), after fifteen years.

The State requested that he be resentenced pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)1. Section (b)1. provides that a juvenile defendant convicted of a capital felony, “who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim,” may be sentenced to prison for a term of life, but must be sentenced to imprisonment for at least forty years if the court finds a life sentence inappropriate. A person sentenced under (b)1. would be entitled to a section 921.1402(2)(a) sentence review after twenty-five years.

If resentenced under (b)2 he would not face the minimum mandatory and would be eligible for review in fifteen years versus twenty-five. Resentencing court conducted a fact-finding analysis that is prohibited under Alleyne and Williams by reviewing transcripts and the court file.

According to Williams, once the resentencing court determined that there was an insufficient jury finding to subject Appellant to sentencing under (b)1., it was compelled to sentence him pursuant to (b)2. The supreme court in Williams specifically considered and rejected the option of empaneling a new jury to make the requisite findings, and clearly chose resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. as the sole remedy on remand.

Reversed for resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., with consideration of the factors set forth in section 921.1401, and with provision for a fifteen-year sentence review in accordance with section 921.1402(c).

CLICK TO READ Joseph Frank Bova II, v. State of Florida, Docket # 5D19-3199

Appeals judgment and sentence entered after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder with a firearm. Appellant argues a new trial is required because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it denied his unequivocal request to represent himself.

The trial court’s stated reason for denying Appellant’s request was Appellant’s capacity to successfully represent himself, as opposed to his capacity to make a knowing waiver of his right to counsel. Disagreement over calling of an expert witness to say that Defendant was insane and to support an insanity defense.

In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself provided that the decision to do so is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Here, the record demonstrates the trial court failed to apply the appropriate legal standard as announced in Faretta and required by rule 3.111. First, the trial court’s Faretta inquiry focused on the merit of Appellant’s proposed trial strategy, rather than his competence to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Second, although the trial court found Appellant’s request was unequivocal,2 the trial court explicitly stated that the reason for denying Appellant’s request was its perception that Appellant’s trial strategy would be fatal to his case. Third, the trial court’s post hoc clarification of its ruling, after a material stage in the proceedings had occurred, does not cure this error.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.