COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

FIRST DEPARTMENT

No reversals reported.

SECOND DEPARTMENT

CLICK TO READ People v. Naquan Hill, Docket # 2018-10497

Sentence as a Persistent Violent Felony Offender to Burglary in the Second Degree reversed.  Defendant was improperly adjudicated a Persistent Violent Felony Offender (New York’s mandatory Three Strikes Law) because Defendant committed the second predicate violent felony offense before he was sentenced for the first predicate violent felony offense.

Sentence reversed, remanded for resentencing.

THIRD DEPARTMENT

CLICK TO READ People v. Casey J. Callahan, Docket # 110027

Conviction after trial of Murder in the Second Degree reversed, new trial ordered. 

In 2000, defendant, a truck driver, and his wife (hereinafter the victim) stopped at a truck stop allegedly because the victim had to use the restroom. The truck stop was located in Pennsylvania just shy of the New York border. After the victim exited the cab, defendant slowly moved the truck, and she was fatally run over by it.

In 2016, Defendant was indicted for Murder in the Second Degree.  The issue in the case was whether this was an accident or an intentional killing.  Prior to trial, the People made a Molineaux application to offer instances of verbal and emotional abuse by Defendant against his wife.  However, the Defendant’s niece proceeded to testify as to instances of physical abuse, some of which she observed, and some of which the wife allegedly told the niece had occurred when the niece was not present.

One witness testified that Defendant told the witness prior to the incident that he could make his truck run over someone and make it look like an accident.  There was evidence that Defendant and his wife had a tumultuous marriage.  Defendant testified that when he told the witness these things, he was only joking, and that the killing was an accident.  There was also evidence at trial that a Pennsylvania law enforcement officer and an insurance investigator both concluded this was an accident.

The Third Department reversed, finding that the testimony exceeded the Molineaux application, and the hearsay also deprived Defendant of a fair trial.  New trial ordered.

FOURTH DEPARTMENT

CLICK TO READ People v. Austin Pratt, Docket # 19-01730

People’s appeal of an order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Indictment, order reversed, case remanded.

Defendant moved to dismiss the Indictment on Speedy Trial grounds.  He was arrested on June 20, 2018, indicted on September 7, 2018 with Predatory Sexual Assault Against a Child, Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree, Use of a Child in a Sexual Performance, Promoting a Sexual Performance by a Child, Possessing a Sexual Performance by a Child, Endangering the Welfare of a Child.  Defendant was arraigned on September 13, 2018 and the People announced ready for trial. 

Trial was scheduled to commence on May 7, 2019. On May 1, 2019, however, the People withdrew their statement of readiness for trial, stating that new evidence had been discovered that required further investigation because it might contain exculpatory information.  Defendant thereafter moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, and County Court granted the motion. The court determined that the purported new evidence had been in the People’s possession for the majority of the postreadiness period, and that the People’s failure to properly inspect the evidence in their possession until the week before trial amounted to a lack of ordinary diligence. The court therefore held that the People’s original statement of readiness was illusory, and the court charged the People with the entire postreadiness period.

The Fourth Department reversed, finding that the People did not delay the case for more than 6 months and therefore, Defendant’s right to a Speedy Trial was not violated on CPL 30.30.  Defendant failed to establish that the People were not ready for trial on September 13, 2018, and the People’s subsequent withdrawal of their statement of readiness did not render their original statement illusory.

Order reversed, motion to dismiss denied, case reinstated.

CLICK TO READ People v. Bernard Dortch, Docket # 18-01289

Conviction of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree after a bench trial reversed, motion to suppress physical evidence and statements granted, Indictment dismissed. 

Police approached Defendant as he was standing on a sidewalk and police mistook him for his brother.  The brother had 2 outstanding arrest warrants.  Defendant fled when police approached him, he was apprehended and a loaded revolver was found in his jacket pocket.  Defendant made post-Miranda statements admitting to possession of the gun.

The Fourth Department reversed, finding that the People failed to show at the suppression hearing that the arrest warrants themselves or other reliable evidence that the warrants were active and valid.  Thus, the People failed to satisfy their burden of proof at the suppression hearing that the police officers’ conduct was legal in the first instance. 

NOTE:  There were two dissenting judges, which means this case is likely headed to the New York Court of Appeals.

CLICK TO READ People v. Chellsie Blue, Docket # 19-00548

Appeal of an Order designating Defendant as a Level 2 Sex Offender, order modified, Defendant designated a Level 1 Sex Offender.

Defendant pled guilty in Federal Court to Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking of a Minor, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1594(c).

The Fourth Department held that the court improperly assessed 25 points under risk factor two for sexual contact with the victim and 20 points under risk factor four for engaging in a continuing course of sexual misconduct because the People did not establish by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that there was any sexual contact between defendant and the victim or that defendant shared the intent of the victim’s clients in engaging her in sexual contact.  These 45 points placed her in the Level 2 range.

CLICK TO READ People v. Keion Peterson, Docket # 15-00651

Guilty plea to Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree reversed, plea vacated, case remanded.

Defendant pled guilty with the promise that his sentence on this case would run concurrently with a 10-year sentence on a separate case in another county.  The other case was reversed and dismissed on appeal.  Because the plea in this case was induced by the promise of a concurrent sentence, which is no longer possible, the judgment must be reversed and the plea vacated.

CLICK TO READ People v. Steven P. Knorr, Docket # 18-01370

Defendant pled guilty to Sexual Abuse in the First Degree.  At sentencing, he was initially sentenced to a one-year term of interim probation and promised that, if he complied with the terms of interim probation, the court would impose a nine-year term of probation. Defendant, however, violated the terms of interim probation.  The court then stated that if it gave defendant “a sentence that’s anywhere less than seven years,” the People would be “looking at [the court] on every single case that” it would have in the future, would conclude that the court’s “word is no good,” and thus would not continue offering plea arrangements to defendants because they would not expect the court to abide by a pre-plea sentencing commitment. Thus, the court said, it had “no choice today. . . but to sentence [defendant]” to seven years’ imprisonment.

The Fourth Department reversed, finding that the court failed to exercise its own discretion in sentencing.  Resentencing ordered.

SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ United States v. Jonathan Delgado, Docket # 15-1453

Conviction after trial for Conspiracy to Violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and related drugs and firearms possession offenses based on Defendant’s membership in a gang and participation in a murder in Buffalo.  The underlying racketeering activity included Defendant’s participation in the double murder of Brandon MacDonald and Darinell Young in 2006. Defendant was seventeen years old when he participated in the murders, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

At his sentencing, the District Court failed to explicitly consider Defendant’s age at the time of the murders, violating the principle recognized by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).

Remanded for resentencing.