FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

No reversals reported.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ Deontae Palinski Johnson v. State of Florida, Docket # 1D19-1474

Appeals multiple convictions, arguing that under Double Jeopardy principles he cannot be convicted of multiple counts of leaving the scene of a crash stemming from a single crash. State charged Johnson with one count of vehicular homicide, one count of leaving the scene of a crash involving death, three counts of leaving the scene of a crash involving injury, and one count of driving with a suspended or revoked license. Prior to trial, the State dropped the driving with a suspended or revoked license charge. Claim of double jeopardy was not preserved, but that is reviewed under fundamental error and can be raised for the first time on appeal.

Leaving the scene of a crash, even one resulting in death to one victim and injury to others, permits only a single conviction.  Vacate the two convictions for leaving the scene of a crash resulting in injury; Affirm the conviction for leaving the scene of crash in which death results; and remand for resentencing

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

 THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ Antonio Cobb v. State of Florida, Docket # 3D19-2423

Appeals summary denial of a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Was convicted following a jury trial of five counts of attempted first-degree murder, in violation of sections 777.04(1) and 782.04(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes, and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

Post-conviction motion denied without evidentiary hearing. Contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) misadvising him as to the ability of the State to convict him on all five counts of attempted murder, thereby precipitating his rejection of a favorable plea offer; (2) informing him that, in the event he testified, the State would be entitled to explore the nature and circumstances of his prior convictions; and (3) failing to investigate and ensure the presence of a material witness.

State concedes partial error. Facially sufficient claims that are not conclusively refuted by the record, so a hearing is required. Newly discovered evidence claims affirmed. Affirmed in part reversed in part.

CLICK TO READ Daniel Lopez v. State of Florida, Docket # 3D18-2217

Appeals conviction and sentence for aggravated assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for the standard Justifiable Use of Non-Deadly Force Jury Instruction 3.6(g).

Stemmed from an incident where there was an argument in a parking lot and a firearm was retrieved from the bed of the truck. There was no testimony of any discharge or attempted discharge or any physical contact made with the firearm to the victim’s body.

“[W]e review a trial court’s decision to exclude a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion . . . .” Rodriguez v. State, 147 So. 3d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Carpenter v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182, 1199–200 (Fla. 2001). However, the trial court’s discretion in whether to give a jury instruction regarding a defense from evidence introduced at trial “is rather narrow because a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his or her theory of defense.”

Radler v. State, 290 So. 3d 87, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting St. Pierre v. State, 228 So. 3d 583, 585–86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). This is so “if there is any evidence to support this theory, no matter how weak or flimsy.” Id. (quoting St. Pierre, 228 So. 3d at 585–86 (internal citations and quotations omitted)).

Testified that he feared for his safety and another witness because he had seen the gun in victim’s car. This prompted him to look for a tool in his truck bed which led to the gun discovery. Maintained throughout trial he neither used force nor threatened use of force. Entitled to requested jury instruction. Reverse and remand for a new trial.

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ Marrio Williams v. State of Florida, Docket # 5D20-817

Appeals summary denial of motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Affirm on most counts but reverse on count that asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a competency evaluation before he was tried and convicted for the first-degree murder of a police informant. Contends that trial counsel did not obtain a competency evaluation despite two doctors’ opinions that he was intellectually disabled. He argues he was prejudiced because of this incompetence and the life sentence imposed. In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, we assume these facts are true unless the record refutes them. Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).

Appellant does not meet the high burden of prejudice, only a general assertion of incompetence, but this is not conclusively refuted by the record so an evidentiary hearing in warranted. Appellant has not yet had the chance to amend his motion, so reverse the summary denial of Ground Thirteen to give him this opportunity, assuming Appellant can do so in good faith. See Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 762 (Fla. 2007).

CLICK TO READ Maurio Hall v. State of Florida, Docket # 5D18-3505

Appeals conviction and sentence after trial for racketeering (“RICO”), possession of heroin, possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, conspiracy to sell or deliver MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine), and conspiracy to sell or deliver heroin.

Appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to sell MDMA was predicated upon testimony from an unidentified voice heard over a taped recording of a telephone conversation between the voice and Appellant. In that recording, the unknown caller agreed to buy some MDMA from Appellant, along with other drugs. Such evidence is not sufficient to prove a “conspiracy,” as Appellant was simply agreeing to sell MDMA, while the caller was agreeing to purchase the drug from Appellant.

Affirm convictions for all counts except reversal for conspiracy to sell MDMA. The record does not conclusively show that the trial court would have imposed the same sentences on Appellant’s other convictions without the now-reversed conviction for conspiracy to sell or deliver MDMA, this matter is remanded to the trial court for Appellant to be resentenced on his remaining convictions using a corrected scoresheet. See Pierce v. State, 281 So. 3d 569, 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ United States v. Johnny Lee Leonard, Docket # 19-11570

Appeals order denying a motion to reduce his sentences pursuant to § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (First Step Act). here, as in Jones, it is not clear from any of the district court’s orders whether the district court understood the extent of its authority to resentence Leonard under the First Step Act. See id. at 1304–05. Its discussion focused only on guideline ranges; it gave no discernable analysis of Leonard’s eligibility or its authority to reduce Leonard’s sentences under the First Step Act. Vacate and remand for district court to reconsider motion with understanding of authority under the First Step Act.