TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

CLICK TO READ Brian Christopher Reed v. The State of Texas, Docket # PD-0918-20

The indictment charged Appellant Brian Christopher Reed with sexual assault by penetrating the victim’s sexual organ with his sexual organ, but the jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of attempted sexual assault. The jury charge’s application paragraph for the lesser did not limit the means of penetration to his sexual organ, and the charge’s definition of sexual assault told the jury that penetration could be committed “by any means.” The jury also heard some evidence that Appellant may have used his mouth, not his sexual organ. The Court of Appeals concluded that Appellant was egregiously harmed by the charge error and reversed.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and reinstated the conviction, finding that the Court of Appeals overestimated the harm because the possibility that the charge error led the jury to find Appellant guilty of attempting to sexually assault the victim with his mouth instead of his sexual organ is hypothetical at best. Although there was a conflict in the evidence over whether Appellant used his sexual organ or used his mouth, the dispute over the means of penetration was tied-up with and ancillary to the greater question of whether to believe the victim’s claim that, when Appellant used his sexual organ, it was not consensual or Appellant’s claim that, when he used his mouth, it was consensual. The case largely revolved around consent. Furthermore, the State did not tell the jury it could convict if it thought Appellant used his mouth. Likewise, the defense did not argue that he should be acquitted because he had committed a different offense than what he was charged with. Instead, the defense criticized the State’s failure to forensically prove penetration by sexual organ.  The harm does not rise to egregious harm. The case was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Bobby Lee Garnous, Docket # WR-94,841-01

Applicant pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. Applicant did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction.  Applicant raises claims of false evidence and involuntary plea related to the discovery of prior misconduct by former Houston Police Officer Gerald Goines, who was the primary witness against Applicant in his case. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that Applicant was denied due process by the use of false evidence against him and that his guilty plea was involuntary.

Habeas relief granted, conviction vacated.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Corey Johnson, Docket # WR-95,268-01

Applicant pleaded guilty and was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance less than one gram and sentenced to one hundred and eighty days’ imprisonment in state jail. Applicant did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction.  Applicant raises claims of false evidence and involuntary plea related to the discovery of prior misconduct by the police officer who was the primary witness against Applicant in his case. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that Applicant was denied due process by the use of false evidence against him and that his guilty plea was involuntary.

Habeas relief granted, conviction vacated.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Dequentun Trey Mitchell, Docket # WR-95,208-01

Applicant pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one year imprisonment. Applicant did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction.  Applicant raises claims of false evidence and involuntary plea related to the discovery of prior misconduct by former Houston Police Officer Gerald Goines, who was the primary witness against Applicant in his case. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that Applicant was denied due process by the use of false evidence against him and that his guilty plea was involuntary.

Habeas relief granted, conviction vacated.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Michael Jerome Clark, Docket # WR-13,739-06

Applicant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.  He filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.073, arguing newly discovered DNA evidence not previously available exonerates him.  New DNA testing in 2021 identifies the DNA profile of an alternative suspect and part of a third DNA profile. Applicant also asserts that there was a reasonable likelihood that false testimony from a DNA examiner affected the judgment of the jury.

Habeas relief was granted a new trial ordered.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Roderick Dwayne Bell, Docket # WR-95,159-01

Applicant pleaded guilty to manufacture/delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. Applicant did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction.  Applicant raises claims of false evidence and involuntary plea related to the discovery of prior misconduct by former Houston Police Officer Gerald Goines, who was the primary witness against Applicant in his case. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that Applicant was denied due process by the use of false evidence against him and that his guilty plea was involuntary.

Habeas relief granted, conviction vacated.

CLICK TO READ Roberto Medina Flores v. The State of Texas, Docket # PD-0562-22

The question in this appeal is whether a trial court expand its jurisdiction and hold a hearing on a motion for new trial outside the 75-day plenary period pursuant to the joint order of the Texas Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, titled First Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster.  The Court of Criminal Appeals held that it could not.

A defendant must file a motion for new trial within 30 days after “the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open court.” TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4. “The court must rule on a motion for new trial within 75 days after imposing or suspending sentence in open court.” Id. at 21.8(a). “A motion not timely ruled on by written order will be deemed denied when the [75-day] period . . . expires.” Id. at 21.8(c). “[O]nce a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law, the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule upon it.”

CLICK TO READ Zimbabwe Raymond Johnson v. The State of Texas, Docket # PD-0055-23 & PD-0056-23

Appellant damaged property in a car accident. He was convicted of failure to perform a duty to provide information after the accident, and he was ordered to pay restitution to the owners of the property he damaged. The question is whether restitution may be ordered for an offense that did not itself cause the damage. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that restitution may not be ordered under those circumstances.

TEXAS FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Khalil Jamehl Vinson, Docket # 01-22-00747-CR

Following a traffic stop, appellee Khalil Jamehl Vinson was charged with driving while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04. Vinson filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed.

The First Court of Appeals reversed and denied suppression.  It held that the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing evidence obtained during the traffic stop because police had reasonable suspicion that Vinson operated his vehicle at night without illuminated headlights and taillights, in violation of Texas Transportation Code section 547.302.

Case remanded.

TEXAS SECOND COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Margo Vasquez, Docket # 07-23-00277-CR

Defendant was charged with Assault by Information and scheduled for trial.  Defense counsel moved in limine to preclude any statements made by the complainant on any recording or medical personnel.  The trial court granted the motion.  The State asked if the police officers would be allowed to testify under the trial court’s ruling. The trial court expressed a concern about hearsay and then stated:

“I just don’t see why we need to have somebody come in here and testify in favor of the complaining witness. She can do that herself, and if she is not willing to do it herself, then I don’t think you can do it – nobody else can do it because, I mean, she is not going to be asked questions by the defendant. I mean, basically it is taking away the right to confrontation, and that is a very important right. I mean, jury trials are really very strict.”

Appellee’s counsel subsequently made an oral motion to dismiss for lack of evidence, arguing that the State could not prove its case without the complaining witness. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion, dismissing the cause with prejudice. No findings of fact or conclusions of law appear in the record.

The Court of Appeals reversed based on the hypothetical possibility of a Confrontation Clause violation, a wholly theoretical complaint. Given that no trial occurred and no testimony was presented, no actual violation occurred. The order was reversed and the case remanded for trial.

CLICK TO READ Amren Alex Grigoryan v. The State of Texas, Docket # 07-23-00046-CR

Defendant traveled from California to Arkansas in a van owned by his brother for business purposes.  He drove back to California alone in the van, and was pulled over in Wheeler County, Texas for a traffic violation.  The deputy who initiated the stop became suspicious Appellant was involved in human trafficking because he was the sole passenger in a van. He began issuing a warning for the traffic violation and questioned Appellant about his travels and whether he had anything illegal with him or any amounts of money. According to the deputy, Appellant told him he was traveling from Arkansas to California, disclosed he had approximately $2,000 to $3,000 in cash, and denied having any contraband.  Defendant consented to a search of the van and found $122,000 in cash in garbage bags, and an additional $2000 near the front seat.  Defendant denied any knowledge of the cash in the garbage bags.  He was arrested and charged with money laundering.  No drugs, paraphernalia, or other contraband was found in the vehicle.

Appellant was indicted for “knowingly possess[ing] the proceeds of criminal activity, namely selling a controlled substance.”  At a bench trial, the State presented the arresting deputy as a witness and the K-9 deputy as an expert witness. The arresting deputy, constantly prefacing his answers with his “training and experience” and “totality of the circumstances,”4 testified that traveling on Interstate 40, a known drug corridor, with air fresheners, food wrappers, blankets, and a large amount of cash were indicators of drug trafficking. He also disbelieved Appellant’s reason for traveling between California and Arkansas in a short period of time. During cross-examination, however, he conceded it was not illegal to drive with air fresheners, possess bundled cash, or travel along Interstate 40 between California and Arkansas. He also conceded that at the time of the stop, he was merely suspicious. He agreed he did not find any indicia of drug dealing such as ledgers, scales, or baggies, and Appellant was not in a suspicious place at the time of his arrest.  A K-9 officer testified that a dog alerted to prior possible drugs on the outside of the van, but not inside the van.

Appellate testified in his own defense and denied knowledge of the cash.  Appellant’s father, through a translator, testified and claimed ownership of the cash bundled in rubber bands. He explained he bought the property in Arkansas as an investment and planned to hire contractors to develop the property.  At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court found Appellant guilty. After a very brief punishment phase, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years’ confinement and assessed an $8,000 fine.

The Court of Appeals reversed and granted a judgment of acquittal.  The Court found the evidence was legally insufficient.  For a money laundering conviction to stand, “there must be direct or circumstantial evidence of a temporal connection, or nexus, between the money and some criminal activity.”  The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a nexus between the cash found in the trash bags and the sale of narcotics.

Conviction reversed, judgment of acquittal granted.

TEXAS EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS NINTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported

TEXAS FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Daniel Curran, Docket # 14-23-00252-CR

A grand jury indicted appellant Daniel Curran for the offense of capital murder during the course of the offense of aggravated robbery and/or burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2).  Appellant’s bond was set at $25 million. Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus to reduce the bond. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

During the hearing, appellant presented one witness: his older brother Jorge Benitez. The State did not present any witnesses. Neither side made closing arguments. When the trial court made its oral ruling in court, the judge stated that he had reviewed the public safety report along with appellant’s criminal history.  No documents are contained in the record.

The right to be free from excessive bail is protected by the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 11.

The amount of bail required in any case is within the discretion of the trial court subject to the following rules:

1. The bail and any conditions of bail shall be sufficient to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the undertaking.
2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as an instrument of oppression.
3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered, including whether the offense:

(A) is an offense involving violence as defined by Article 17.03(b-3)(2); or

(B) involves violence directed against a peace officer.

4. The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be taken on this point.
5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law enforcement, and the community shall be considered.
6. The criminal history record information for the defendant, including information obtained through the statewide telecommunications system maintained by the Department of Public Safety and through the public safety report system developed under Article 17.021, shall be considered, including any acts of family violence, other pending criminal charges, and any instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court following released on bail.
7. The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15.

In addition to these rules, case law provides that courts may consider the following set of factors: (l) the defendant’s work record; (2) the defendant’s family and community ties; (3) the defendant’s length of residency; (4) the defendant’s prior criminal record; (5) the defendant’s conformity with previous bond conditions; (6) the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; (7) the aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense; and (8) whether the defendant is a citizen of the United States.

When determining reasonable bail, a trial court shall give the most weight to the nature of the offense and the length of possible sentence.  Bail needs to be in an amount sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the defendant will appear. When bail is set so high that a person cannot realistically pay it, however, the trial court essentially “displaces the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a guaranteed trial appearance.”  Bail set in a particular amount becomes oppressive when it assumes the defendant cannot afford bail in that amount and when it is set for the express purpose of forcing the defendant to remain incarcerated.

Here, from the limited record, there is no reason for setting the bond at $25 million, other than for the express purpose of forcing appellant to remain incarcerated.  Because the amount set in this case is wholly unprecedented and without specific supporting evidence, the Court of Appeals held the trial court abused its discretion, and reverses and remanded for the setting of a bond amount consistent with this court’s opinion.

CLICK TO READ Richard Dotson v. The State of Texas, Docket # 14-22-00390-CR

The State indicted Defendant for the state jail felony of possession of a controlled substance. Regarding enhancements, the State alleged two prior convictions – a 1992 burglary and a 1998 delivery of a controlled substances.  After Defedant was convicted after a jury trial, he pleaded true to these enhancements. The court admitted evidence of Defendant’s stipulation to sixteen prior convictions and various judgments of convictions. Three of these convictions were felonies.  The trial court instructed the jury “you are to find ‘true’ the allegations of Enhancement Paragraph One and Enhancement Paragraph Two of the indictment.” The court instructed the jury to assess punishment at confinement in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) for not less than two years nor more than twenty years, the range applicable to a second degree felony. The jury found the allegations true and assessed punishment at confinement in the TDCJ for eighteen years.

The Court of Appeals reversed ths sentence, finding that the sentence was illegal due to insufficient evidence to support enhancement to a second degree felony.  To enhance appellant’s punishment to the range for a second degree felony, under the enhancement statute applicable to this case, the State was required to prove that appellant had been “previously finally convicted of two felonies, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final.”  In 2001, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the two felonies used for enhancement to the punishment level of a second degree felony, under this statute, could not be state jail felonies.

The conviction alleged in the second enhancement paragraph — the 1998 conviction for possession of a controlled substance—was a state jail felony. Thus, it could not be used to enhance appellant’s sentence.  Nor could his other two prior felonies – one from 1980 and one from 1990 – be used as an enhancement because the State failed to prove when the 1990 or 1980 conviction became final—a requirement to enhance appellant’s sentence.