NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT

No reversals reported.

NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

CLICK TO READ State of New Jersey v. Taviaus Wilson, James Hooks, and Sadale Loatman, Docket # A-1365-23

This case presents two issues concerning the scope and intensity of searches conducted under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  Can police search a glove box based solely on the smell of marijuana coming from the inside of a vehicle without determining whether the odor is coming specifically from an area?

Does the New Jersey automobile exception extend to a glove box that is intentionally locked, it has a higher expectation of privacy compared to objects left out in the open, and closed opaque containers?

Here, police were on patrol in a marked vehicle when they observed the Defendant’s car had an unlawful tint and executed a traffic stop. When stopped Defendants identified themselves and were informed by police of the reason for the stop.

When speaking with a defendant the officer detected the strong odor of marijuana that “emanated throughout the entire vehicle.” But did not indicate whether the odor was more prominent in any specific location.

Defendants explained the vehicle’s interior smelled like marijuana because they were at a party.   They then turned off the vehicle and when each defendant was searched individually the officer discovered no contraband on their person.

After searching the occupants but finding no marijuana, officers proceeded to search the vehicle for the source of the odor. They searched the front seat area, backseat, side door, and center console. The other officer tested the glove box and found it to be locked. Zanni instructed the officer to unlock the glove box with the car key. That search immediately revealed the handguns.

After the handguns were secured, the occupants were advised they were under arrest, handcuffed, and placed in the rear of separate patrol vehicles. The search resumed and a mason jar containing marijuana was found in the trunk area as well as other drug paraphernalia.

The trial court determined that the handgun should be suppressed. The Appellate Division  concluded that it misinterpreted the automobile exception principles and reversed the decision.

According to the Appellate Division, he smell of marijuana emanating from the provided probable cause to search the entire interior for marijuana, including the glove box, since that was a place where marijuana could be concealed. While searching within the passenger compartment, the officers were not required to pinpoint the exact source of the odor before opening containers situated within that space.

Locking the glove box does not create a heightened expectation of privacy comparable to that which applies to a home, taking that compartment outside the realm of the automobile exception.

Nor does it matter whether the contents of the locked glove box were inaccessible to the vehicle occupants. 

Order reversed, suppression denied, Indictment reinstated.

CLICK TO READ State of New Jersey v. Eduardo J. Lesme, Docket # A-2855-20

The Defendant was the owner of a bar and argued with a victim over the cost of a service. He then unholstered his firearm and waived it, briefly pointing its muzzle toward the victim and threatening the victim’s family.

Later that same night a bar regular arrived and the Defendant approached, unholstered his firearm, and held it to their neck. They fell to the ground in a struggle and the Defendant told the regular not to come back or he would be killed.

An officer was later called to secure the gun as a personal favor of an employee of the bar. Because the officers secured the gun as a personal favor, they initially did not intend to write a report. Later they wrote two reports regarding retrieval of the gun after learning that it may have been used in an incident at the bar. 

Rule 3:7-6 permits the State to charge multiple offenses in a single indictment “if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on [two] or more acts or transactions connected together.” 

“Rule 3:15-2(b) vests a trial court with discretion to order separate trials if joinder would prejudice unfairly a defendant.”  To avoid prejudicial joinder, the court must conclude the proffered evidence for each set of charges would be admissible in a separate trial on the other set of charges.”

Rule 404(b) bars the admission of other-crimes evidence “to prove a person’s disposition to show that . . . the person acted in conformity with such disposition.” N.J.R.E. 404(b).

In Cofield, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a multi-factor test to determine when and in what circumstances “other crime” evidence is admissible in a criminal trial. 127 N.J. at 338.

The first Cofield factor requires evidence to be relevant to a material issue. Here, the defendant did not contest possessing the weapon.  The Appellate Division ruled that evidence was relevant to knowledge or absent of mistake, which were not material issues in dispute.

The fourth Cofield factor is that the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  Here, the State’s proofs on two sets of charges pose a risk the jury would base their decision on impermissible character evidence –  the Defendant being a “hothead”.

Therefore the motion court erroneously denied the Defendant’s motion to sever. The defendant should have been tried separately, once for each victim. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

CLICK TO READ State of New Jersey v. Michael Owens, Docket # A-1148-22

On the evening of July 17, 2020, Hamilton Township police officers responded to a report of domestic violence between the Defendant and his girlfriend.

He discovered that another man had telephoned her. Enraged, he grabbed her by the throat and began to choke her. She escaped the Defendant’s grip, but immediately afterward, the Defendant snatched her cell phone and car keys and drove off in her black Chevrolet Malibu.

With the Defendant’s departure, his girlfriend went to a neighbor’s house and asked them to call the police. While there, called the victim, and within approximately forty-five minutes of the domestic violence incident police responded to gunfire in the area.

Upon arrival, police found the victim lying in the middle of the street outside of his home. Police and emergency medical personnel rendered aid on the scene.

In the investigation that followed, police learned the victim had been speaking angrily on the phone just before he was shot. GPS location and cell phone data tracked the Defendant’s girlfriend’s phone to the immediate vicinity of the homicide at the time of the shooting.

Police also secured surveillance video from various locations in the area. From this footage, they identified the black Chevrolet Malibu at the scene of the shooting. Video showed the fatal shots were fired from that vehicle. Present in the car was an individual matching the Defendant’s description.

Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a); (2) second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); (3) second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); (4) third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(13); (5) fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (M.L.’s cell phone), N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a); and (6) second-degree certain person not to have a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).

Defendant moved to sever the aggravated assault and theft charges, arguing that the prejudice would outweigh any probative value.  Specifically, Defendant asked to sanitized the evidence of choking the girlfriend.  The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was found guilty of all charges.

The Appellate Division reversed Defendant’s convictions of first-degree murder and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and vacated the sentence imposed on those counts and remanded for a new trial. In addition, the Appellate Division vacated Defendant’s conviction of fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking and dismissed it with prejudice because the State failed to prove Defendant intended to permanently deprive the victim of her property.

The Court remanded for resentencing on Defendant’s convictions for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit and second-degree aggravated assault, which Defendant did not challenge. Should this matter be retried on the vacated charges, the trial court must sanitize presentation of the aggravated assault charge as provided herein.

CLICK TO READ State of New Jersey v. Leonard K. Johnson, Docket # A-0665-22

The Defendant was convicted of the first-degree armed robbery of a Vineland bank.  Before trial, the defendant moved under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to suppress inculpatory statements he made during an interview with police and an FBI agent.

However, Defendant did not rely on his statement to police where he was videorecorded stating

“I don’t have anything to say about it[,]”-  and “I don’t have anything to say.”  The trial court denied the motion.

Defendant was convicted, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.

Defendant filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to argue that his statements made following his invocation of silence should have been suppressed.  The trial court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, finding that Defendant set forth a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.

CLICK TO READ State of New Jersey v. Brandon D. Williams, Docket # A-3234-22

A Camden County police detective saw a black Chevrolet Malibu, driven by the Defendant, make several illegal turns without signaling as it circled a block in East Camden “at a high rate of speed.” He then saw the Malibu park outside a grocery store, where another car pulled up next to it. The other car’s driver, an unidentified man, left his car stepping into the Malibu with defendant, where they talked. Five minutes later, the man got out of the Malibu and returned to his car. Both cars then drove away.

The detective did not see the men exchange anything, nor could he hear what was being said inside the Malibu.  He did not know the second person either.  The detective radioed to marked police cars to conduct a traffic stop, and he was found to lack a driver’s license but did have other identification.  The Malibu was a rental car that was rented under another person’s name.  He refused to answer questions to the officers and the detective, and later signed a consent to search form.  Police found two handguns, an extended magazine, and 138 bags of “white rock-like” drugs under the car’s gearshift. Defendant was arrested.

Defendant moved to suppress arguing that there was no probable cause to request to search the car.  The trial court denied the motion.  Defendant pled guilty and reserved the right to appeal the denial of suppression.

The Appellate Division reversed and granted suppression.  The New Jersey Constitution prevents police from randomly seeking consent to search a motor vehicle. The circumstances under which police may a request a search is spelled out in State v. Carty.  There, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that “unless there is a reasonable and articulable basis (suspicion) beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional.”

Reasonable suspicion is defined as “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Pineiro. There must be “some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”

The Appellate Division held that despite having probable cause to stop Defendant’s car because of the numerous motor vehicle violations, the police had no legal basis to solicit Defendant’s request to search his car.  The Court reversed and vacated the Defendant’s conviction.