FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

No reversals reported

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ Sirarthur Stefon Daniels v. State of Florida, Docket # 2D22-3296

Defendant was charged with Aggravated Battery after a physical altercation occurred between him and the complainant, with whom he was in a romantic relationship and had been living together.  The incident was witnessed by Bridget Riesenbeck.  Riesenback’s testimony supported Defendant’s version of events and contradicted the complainant’s testimony. 

Mr. Daniels’ primary defense was that he was acting in self defense.  The trial judge read the jury instructions for the justifiable use of nondeadly force, but also included the following instruction: “[T]he use of non-deadly force is not justified if you find that [Mr. Daniels] was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of an Aggravated Battery.”  Defendant’s attorney did not object to the jury instruction.  The jury found Defendant guilty of Aggravated Battery and he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, finding the improper instruction was fundamental error that required reversal even if counsel failed to object.  The Second DCA drew a distinction between agreeing to an improper instruction, which waives any claim on appeal, versus acquiescing to an improper jury instruction.  Here, counsel simply acquiesced by simply responding “Yes” when asked by the court if he had looked at the proposed instructions, and responding “No” when asked if there were any objections after the instructions were read to the jury.

The instruction on the forcible-felony exception removed Daniels’ main defense from the consideration of the jury, without which a jury could have determined that the State failed to meet its burden that his use of nondeadly force was not justified.  A new trial was ordered.

CLICK TO READ State of Florida v. Mitchell Williams Reddin, Docket # 2D22-3853

Defendant was observed speeding on a motorcycle by a New Port Richey police officer.  The officer pursued him and pulled him over and arrested him in a different town.  Defendant was charged with Reckless Driving, Florida Statutes § 316.192, Resisting an Officer Without Violence, Florida Statutes § 843.02.  At trial the court asked the officer what authority he had to make an extraterritorial arrest.  The officer testified that he had authority to stop the motorcyclist in Port Richey because he was also a deputy with the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO).  The court interrupted the State’s redirect of the officer to ask whether he had any documentation to support his testimony regarding his authority to make an arrest outside of New Port Richey. The officer said that he did but that it was in his vehicle. The trial court made the parties take a break so the officer could get his documents, and it told the parties they would need to recall the officer “because he’s going to have to testify about this jurisdiction with the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office.” The trial court then sent the jury out of the room and—without any prompting from the defense—told the State: “I need for you to show me that [the officer] has unbridled discretion as a Pasco County Sheriff’s deputy to handle any kind of cases” in Port Richey.

The State provided the trial court with the officer’s PCSO credentials and a mutual aid agreement between New Port Richey and Port Richey. The State also reminded the trial court that the reckless driving charge began in New Port Richey and that an officer in fresh pursuit has authority to make an arrest in another jurisdiction.  However, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the charges, finding the officer lacked jurisdiction.  The State did not have a witness from the Port Richey Police Department available to testify at trial that day, the trial court found that the State could not prove that the New Port Richey officer complied with the mutual aid agreement when he stopped Mr. Reddin.  The State appealed.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the charges.  The Court rejected the defense’s argument that Double Jeopardy applied because the dismissal was not based on guilt or innocence, but rather a purely legal issue.  Additionally, the Court ruled that Section 901.25(2), Florida Statutes (2021), provides that “[a]ny duly authorized state, county, or municipal arresting officer is authorized to arrest a person outside the officer’s jurisdiction when in fresh pursuit.” This statute expands on the common law rule that “an officer may pursue a felon or a suspected felon, with or without a warrant, into another jurisdiction and arrest him there.”

Order reversed, case reinstated.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ State of Florida v. Daniel Arshadnia, Docket # 3D22-524

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant of Defendant’s residence and discovered, among other items, marijuana plants and cereal bars. Laboratory testing confirmed the presence of THC in the cereal bars. The chemist could not, however, offer an opinion as to the source of the THC.  The State filed an amended information charging Defendant Trafficking Between 25 and 2,000 pounds of Cannabis, Florida Statutes § 893.135(1)(a)1.,  Possession of a Place for the Purpose of Trafficking in Cannabis, Florida Statutes §  893.1351(1), and Trafficking More than 1,000 grams of a Synthetic Cannabinoid, Florida Statutes § 893.135(1)(m)2.c. and 893.03(1)(c)190.

Defendant moved to dismiss the last count. In his motion, he asserted the State was unable to establish that the THC in the cereal bars was of synthetic origin; as a result, he argued, the charge was improper.  The State opposed the motion. The State conceded the THC “could have come from any part of the cannabis plant, including the resin, the flower, [or] the stems.” But he contended “synthetic cannabinoids” is something of a misnomer because the term is capaciously defined under Florida law to encompass all THC, regardless of origin. Relying upon the holding by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in State v. Stevenson, 307 So. 3d 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), the trial court granted the motion.  The State appealed.

The Third District Court of Appeal noted that 893.03(1)(c)190. entitled “Synthetic Cannabinoids”  contains a description, rather than a definition, of the term.  In the absence of a statutory definition, the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of the term controls.  However, the prosecutor was unable to establish the THC was synthetic in origin. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the trafficking in synthetic cannabinoids count because “the undisputed material facts do not legally constitute the crime.”

Order affirmed.

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

CLICK TO READ State of Florida v. Christopher Russel Hubbs, Docket # 4D2022-3048

The Defendant was charged with two counts of Possession of a Depiction of Sexual Performance by a Child, Florida Statutes §  827.071(5)(a), and one count of Soliciting a Child for Unlawful Sexual Conduct Using a Computer, Florida Statutes § 847.0135(3)(b).  These charges arose from the arrest of another suspect, where law enforcement found a series of text messages between the Defendant and the other suspect where they discussed meeting in person so Defendant could have sex with a child.  On Defendant’s motion, the trial court severed the two possession charges from the solicitation charge.  The defense moved in in limine to restrict the State’s evidence on the two possession counts. He argued, among other things, the approximately thirty-seven pages of text messages between him and the other suspect were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, and inadmissible under Florida Statutes § 90.402 and 90.403.  The defense argued that the messages spanned several weeks and discussed “all different types of stuff,” including sexual fantasies, and allowing the jury to consider them would be tantamount to “criminalizing gross thoughts.”  The trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the motion in limine, finding most of the messages were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The trial court excluded all messages except for eight messages.

The State appealed the order.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that messages expressing the Defendant’s sexual interest in the child as a reason for requesting the photographs would certainly be relevant to the State’s burden of proof at trial, as well as necessary to establish the entire context out of which the charged crimes arose and adequately describe the events leading up to the charged crimes.

The Fourth DCA remanded the case for reconsideration of relevance and prejudice effect v. probative value.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

No reversals reported.