UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

CLICK TO READ Flowers v. Mississippi, Docket # 17-9572

Curtis Flowers was tried 6 times for murder in Mississippi.  Flowers is black, three of the four victims were white.  At the first two trials, the State used its peremptory strikes on all of the qualified black prospective jurors.  Those convictions were reversed. At the third trial, the State used all of its 15 peremptory strikes againstblack prospective jurors, and the jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed again,this time concluding that the State exercised its peremptory strikes on the basis of race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79. Flowers’ fourth and fifth trials ended in mistrials. At the fourth, the State exercised 11 peremptory strikes—all against black prospective jurors. No available racial information exists about the prospective jurors in the fifth trial. At the sixth trial, the State exercised six peremptory strikes—five against black prospective jurors, allowing one black juror to be seated.  This conviction was upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that the State’s pattern at six trials demonstrated that the use of peremptory challenges was motivated by intent to remove black jurors from the jury.  The State’s use of peremptory strikes in Flowers’ sixth trial followed the same pattern as the first four trials.

This was a 7-2 opinion and strongly reaffirms the principles of Batson v. Kentucky.

CLICK TO READ Mitchell v. Wisconsin, Docket # 18-6210

Mitchell was arrested for drunk driving and passed out on the way to the police station.  He was transported to the hospital but was unconscious.  His blood was drawn anyway without a warrant under a state law that presumes that a person incapable of withdrawing implied consent to blood alcohol has not done so.  His motion to suppress based on a lack of a warrant was denied, and he appealed.

The Supreme Court held that that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement generally permits a blood test without a warrant.  The Court’s decision rested on 4 different reasons:  1.  Highway safety is a vital public interest, 2. lawmakers have long been convinced that legal limits on a driver’s blood alcohol concentration, 3.  Enforcing drunk driving laws requires a test that is accurate enough to stand up in court, and the testing must be prompt because it is “a biological certainty” that “[a]lcohol dissipates from the bloodstream,” “literally disappearing bythe minute.” Finally, when a breath test is unavailable to promote the interests served by legal BAC limits, “a blood draw becomes necessary.”

CLICK TO READ Rehaif v. United States, Docket # 17-9560

Petitioner Rehaif entered the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa to attend university but was dismissed for poor grades. He subsequently shot two firearms at a firing range. The Government prosecuted him under 18 U.S.C. §922(g), which makes it unlawful forcertain persons, including aliens illegally in the country, to possess firearms, and §924(a)(2), which provides that anyone who “knowingly violates” the first provision can be imprisoned for up to 10 years. The jury at Rehaif’s trial was instructed that the Government was not required to prove that he knew that he was unlawfully in the country. It returned a guilty verdict. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court held that in order to prove 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Davis, Docket # 18-431

The Defendants were charged with Hobbs Act robbery and also 18 U.S.C. §924(c), which authorizes heightened criminal penalties for using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with any federal “crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”  “Crime of violence” is defined in two subparts: the elements clause, §924(c)(3)(A), and the residual clause, §924(c)(3)(B). The residual clause in turn defines a “crime of violence” as a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committingthe offense.”

The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), the Residual Clause, is unconstitutionally vague.  Recent case law has cast significant doubt on the constitutionality of the Residual Clause, and the Supreme Court went further in this case.

CLICK TO READ United States v. Haymond, Docket # 17-1672

Andre Haymond was convicted of possessing child pornography, a crime that carries a prison term of zero to 10 years. After serving a prison sentence of 38 months, and while on supervised release, Mr. Haymond was again found with what appeared to be childpornography. The government sought to revoke his supervised release and secure a new and additional prison sentence. A district judge, acting without a jury, found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Haymond knowingly downloaded and possessed childpornography. Under 18 U. S. C. §3583(e)(3), the judge could havesentenced him to a prison term of between zero and two additional years. But because possession of child pornography is an enumeratedoffense under §3583(k), the judge instead imposed that provision’s 5year mandatory minimum. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit observedthat whereas a jury had convicted Mr. Haymond beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime carrying a prison term of zero to 10 years, this new prison term included a new and higher mandatory minimum resting on facts found only by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. The Tenth Circuit therefore held that §3583(k) violated the right totrial by jury guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

The Supreme Court held that that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) in this case violated Mr. Haymond’s right to trial by jury.  The violation of supervised release is part of the penalty for the initial offense, which carried only a 0 to 10 years. By increasing the mandatory minimum, the judge increased the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment.