TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Alberto Longoria, Docket # WR-94,502 -01 & -02

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of Aggravated Assault and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision.  The Defendant violated community supervision and was resentenced to two concurrent ten-year prison terms.  He filed a motion for a new trial but the motion was meritless and deficient.  Defendant sought habeas corpus relief, and the trial court ruled that counsel was ineffective at the revocation proceedings.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the convictions were set aside.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Brice Blankenship, Docket # WR-94,997-01

Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment.  He filed an 11.07 Habeas Corpus petition, arguing that the State failed to disclose material impeachment evidence before the jury trial and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.  The trial court found that the withheld impeachment evidence was material and that trial counsel should have retained an expert and used other available impeachment evidence and granted habeas corpus relief and a new trial.  The Court of Criminal Appeals confirmed the trial court’s finding.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Bryan Wayne Whillhite, Docket # WR-94,154-01

Defendant pled guilty to Sexual Assault of a Child and Online Solicitation of a Minor, was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision and violated and resentenced to 75 years.  On direct appeal, the online solicitation charge was reversed and dismissed.

Defendant filed an 11.07 petition, arguing that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the online solicitation of a child charge. The trial court has found that the sentence issued at adjudication would likely have been different had the parties and judge realized that one of the charges had already been declared unconstitutional.  The trial court recommended a new sentencing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals confirmed that finding.

New sentencing ordered.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Cedric Friel Woods, Docket # WR-94,858-02

Defendant pled guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance, and later filed an 11.07 petition on the grounds that his guilty plea was involuntary because at the time of his plea, he was not aware that the substance he possessed contained no controlled substances. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that Applicant’s plea was involuntary.

Plea vacated and set aside.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Deanotra Lwan Hopkins, Docket # WR-94,704-01

Defendant pled guilty to Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment.  He challenged his conviction in an 11.07 petition arguing that his plea was involuntary because trial counsel erroneously advised Applicant on his parole eligibility.  The trial court denied relief.

The Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief because it was clear from the record that parole eligibility was an important factor in Applicant’s decision to plead guilty, and counsel erroneously told him that he would be eligible for parole in eleven months when he was not eligible until he served half his sentence, or four years.

Relief granted.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Gregory Terrell Williams, Docket # WR-95,166-01

Defendant pled guilty to Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, and challenged his guilty plea as involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Trial counsel incorrectly believed, as did the State, that Applicant had a duty to register as a sex offender for life based on a 1979 conviction. However, Applicant’s duty to register had already ended because he was a juvenile when he committed the 1979 offense.  The trial court and the parties agree that the conviction should be set aside and vacated.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte James Renfro, Docket # WR-95,035-01

 Defendant pled guilty to Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child and was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.  He did not appeal, but filed an 11.07 petition alleging his plea was involuntary because the trial court erroneously admonished him during the plea hearing as to the punishment range for the offense and to his parole eligibility, and that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) erroneously advising him as to the punishment range and his parole eligibility, and (2) failing to correct the trial court’s erroneous admonishments during the plea hearing.  Trial counsel filed an affidavit alleging he accurately advised Applicant regarding the parole consequences of pleading guilty. Applicant alleges that, at the time he entered his guilty plea, he incorrectly believed that he was pleading to a thirty-year sentence with the possibility of parole after serving fifteen years when in reality that he was pleading to a thirty-year sentence that had to be served day-for-day.  The transcript of the plea hearing shows that the trial court affirmatively misadvised Applicant that he would be eligible for parole after serving half of his sentence when he was in fact ineligible for parole, that Applicant confirmed that this was his understanding, and that trial counsel (as well as the State) not only failed to correct the trial court’s erroneous admonishment but affirmed its accuracy. Applicant credibly asserts that the difference between his understanding and reality regarding his parole eligibility was a “deal breaker”; He would have exercised his right to a jury trial had he been advised and admonished correctly about parole.

Plea vacated.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Jason Richard Eidam, Docket # WR-94,627-01

Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.  Upon his parole, the TDCJ parole panel imposed Special Condition M (sex offender registration) and Special Condition X (i.e., sex offender treatment), including completion of a sex offender education program as a condition of Applicant’s parole release, when he had not been convicted of a sex offense and the panel had not determined that he constituted a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control.  The reason was a 1996 Michigan conviction for Criminal Sexual Conduct, a consensual sexual act committed when the victim was between 13 and 16 years old and Defendant was not more than 4 years older than the victim.  The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Michigan conviction was not a sex offense for purposes of Texas Government Code §§ 508.228 and 508.1862. Applicant has no convictions that are sex offenses.  Therefore, imposition of sex offender conditions violated Due Process.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Joyce Latrice Coby, Docket # WR-95,132-01

Defendant pled guilty to Delivery of Cocaine and was sentenced to 8 months imprisonment.  She later filed an 11.07 petition after allegations came to light involving prior misconduct by former Houston Police Officer Gerald Goines, who was the sole witness.  The trial court held that Defendant was denied Due Process by the use of false evidence against her and the guilty plea was involuntary.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the granting of habeas corpus relief.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Orlando Martinez, Docket # WR-93,799-01

Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Sexual Assault, Indecency with a Child, and Continuous Sexual Assault of a Child.  He filed an 11.07 petition arguing that Double Jeopardy precluded convictions for both Aggravated Sexual Assault and Indecency with a Child are based on the same actions and same victim as his conviction for Continuous Sexual Assault of a Child and therefore violate Double Jeopardy.  Those first two charges were vacated and set aside.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Ralph Bennett Fuller, Jr., Docket # WR-94,828-01

Defendant was convicted of Evading Arrest which was a state-jail felony, and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.  He challenged his sentence in an 11.07 petition arguing his sentence was illegal because the trial court ordered that it be served in the penitentiary rather than the state jail.  The State conceded.

CLICK TO READ Ex Parte Willie Mornel Thomas, Docket # WR-94,420-01

Defendant was convicted of Capital Murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.  He then filed an 11.07 petition alleging that the State presented false and material DNA expert testimony which violated his due process rights. At trial, DNA analyst Christina Capt testified that Applicant could not be excluded from the DNA mixture on the trigger of the murder weapon, that all the other co-defendants were excluded, and that 99.8% of all randomly tested individuals would be excluded from the profile. The State argued that Applicant was the shooter based on that testimony.

Pursuant to a request for post-conviction forensic DNA testing, the DNA profile from the trigger of the pistol was from 3 different people and the new report states that the mixture on the trigger was from three individuals and that the new interpretation “indicates support for the proposition that Willie Thomas is excluded as a possible contributor to the profile.” This directly contradicts the expert’s testimony at trial.  He challenged the use of false testimony in his 11.07 petition.

In any habeas claim alleging the use of material false testimony, the court must determine (1) whether the testimony was, in fact, false, and, if so, (2) whether the testimony was material.  To determine whether testimony is false, the proper question is whether the particular testimony, taken as a whole, gives the jury a false impression.  False testimony is material if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony affected Applicant’s conviction or sentence.

Here, the State emphasized the DNA results in its closing arguments and that the appellate court relied on the DNA results in upholding the sufficiency of the evidence to support Defendant’s conviction.  The Court found that the DNA interpretation was material and false and that Applicant’s due process rights were violated by the use of such testimony.  A new trial was ordered.

TEXAS FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS SECOND COURT OF APPEALS

CLICK TO READ The State of Texas v. Frederick Lloyd Collier, Docket # 02-23-00121-CR

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor Indecent Assault after a trial, and he was sentenced to a suspended 1-year sentence.  Defendant timely moved for a new trial, which the court granted 84 days after sentencing.  The State appealed arguing that the the trial court could not grant Collier’s new-trial motion more than 75 days after it had suspended Collier’s sentence and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by granting Collier a new trial based on a Brady violation.

The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the lacked authority to grant a new trial because Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.8 requires a trial court to rule on a new-trial motion within 75 days after imposing or suspending sentence in open court.  If the trial court does not rule on the motion by written order before the 75-day period expires, the motion is deemed denied.

Conviction reinstated.

TEXAS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS NINTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.

TEXAS FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No reversals reported.